

# Agenda

## Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure

June 22, 2016

4:00 to 6:00 p.m.

Scott M. Matheson Courthouse

450 South State Street

Judicial Council Room

Administrative Office of the Courts, Suite N31

Welcome and recognition of and appreciation for service to outgoing members Tim Shea, Lori Woffinden, Judge Lyle Anderson, and Steve Marsden.		Jonathan Hafen
Approval of minutes.	Tab 1	Jonathan Hafen
Rule 4(d)(1)(A). Personal Service. <i>Comments to proposed amendments.</i>	Tab 2	Nancy Sylvester
Rule 58C. Motion to renew judgment.	Tab 3	Judge Joseph Bean, Nancy Sylvester
Rule 35. Physical and mental examination of persons.	Tab 4	Trystan Smith, Judge James Blanch, Barbara Townsend
FRCP Rule 34(b)((2)(A)-(C) Requests for Production.	Tab 5	Nancy Sylvester
FRCP Rule 37(e) Failure to Preserve ESI	Tab 6	Nancy Sylvester, Paul Stancil

**Committee Webpage:** <http://www.utcourts.gov/committees/civproc/>

**Meeting Schedule:**

September 28, 2016

November 16, 2016

October 26, 2016

Tab 1















# Tab 2



















1 **Rule 4. Process.**

2 **(a) Signing of summons.** The summons ~~shall~~must be signed and issued by the plaintiff or the  
3 plaintiff's attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and ~~served~~issued.

4 **(b)(i) Time of service.** ~~In~~Unless the summons and complaint are accepted, the summons and  
5 complaint in an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of the  
6 complaint shall must be served no later than 120 days after ~~the filing of the complaint is filed.~~ unless the  
7 The court may allows a longer period of time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are  
8 not timely served, the action ~~shall~~against the unserved defendant will be dismissed, without prejudice on  
9 application motion of any party or ~~upon~~on the court's own initiative.

10 ~~(b)(ii) In any action brought against two or more defendants on which service has been timely~~  
11 ~~obtained upon one of them,~~

12 ~~(b)(ii)(A) the plaintiff may proceed against those served, and~~

13 ~~(b)(ii)(B) the others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial.~~

14 **(c) Contents of summons.**

15 (c)(1) The summons ~~shall~~must:

16 ~~(c)(1)(A) contain the name and address of the court, the address of the court, the names of~~  
17 ~~the parties to the action, and the county in which it is brought; It shall~~

18 ~~(c)(1)(B) be directed to the defendant;~~

19 ~~(c)(1)(C) state the name, address and telephone number of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, and~~  
20 ~~otherwise the plaintiff's address and telephone number; It shall~~

21 ~~(c)(1)(D) state the time within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in~~  
22 ~~writing; and shall~~

23 ~~(c)(1)(E) notify the defendant that in case of failure to ~~do so~~ answer in writing, judgment by~~  
24 ~~default will be rendered entered against the defendant; It shall and~~

25 ~~(c)(1)(F) state either that the complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be~~  
26 ~~filed with the court within ~~ten~~ 10 days of after service.~~

27 (c)(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons ~~shall~~must also:

28 ~~(c)(2)(A) state that the defendant need not answer if the complaint is not filed within 10 days~~  
29 ~~after service; and shall~~

30 ~~(c)(2)(B) state the telephone number of the clerk of the court where the defendant may call at~~  
31 ~~least 14 days after service to determine if the complaint has been filed.~~

32 (c)(3) If service is ~~made~~ by publication, the summons ~~shall~~must also briefly state the subject  
33 matter and the sum of money or other relief demanded, and that the complaint is on file with the  
34 court.

35 **(d) Methods of service.** The summons and complaint may be served in any state or judicial district  
36 of the United States. Unless waived in writing service is accepted, service of the summons and complaint  
37 shallmust be by one of the following methods:











# Tab 3



## RENEWAL OF JUDGMENT

U.C.A. 78B-6-1801 et. seq.

Prior to 2011, in order to renew a judgment, the creditor was required to file a completely new action, establishing a new case. When judgment entered, the court generally added the accrued interest to the judgment to establish a “new” or “renewed” judgment amount. The principal on the new judgment was larger in that it now included the accrued interest. The interest rate on the new judgment was the contractual rate, or the new statutory rate for the year of the renewal.

In 2011, the Utah Legislature passed the “Renewal of Judgment Act,” U.C.A. §78B-6-1801 et. seq. which states, in pertinent part, as follows:

U.C.A. §78B-6-1802

A court of record may renew a judgment issued by a court if:

- (1) a motion is filed within the original action;
- (2) the motion is filed before the statute of limitations on the original judgment expires;
- (3) the motion includes an affidavit that contains an accounting of the original judgment and all postjudgment payments, credits, and other adjustments which are provided for by law or are contained within the original judgment;
- (4) the facts in the supporting affidavit are determined by the court to be accurate and the affidavit affirms that notice was sent to the most current address known for the judgment debtor;
- (5) the time for responding to the motion has expired; and
- (6) the fee required by Subsection 78A-2-301(1)(l) has been paid to the clerk of the court.

U.C.A. §78B-6-1803 – Notice

Notice of a motion for renewal of judgment is served in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure and opposition may be filed pursuant to the rules.

U.C.A. §78B-6-1804 – Date and Duration

Upon granting a motion for the renewal of judgment, the court shall enter an order which renews the original judgment from the date of entry of the order or from the scheduled expiration date of the original order, whichever occurs first, for the same amount of time as the original judgment.

- Some states, including California, allow renewed judgments to include accrued interest in the new principal amount. As a result, many creditors frequently renew the same judgment in order to achieve the effect of compound interest, even though the original contract calls for simple interest. CCP §685.010 et. seq.
- Utah law appears to take a more conservative approach.

- In *Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 2015 UT 11, the Utah Supreme Court held:

But the Renewal of Judgment Act completely changed the landscape by creating a new mechanism for renewing a judgment. Parties seeking to renew a judgment now do so by filing “a motion ... *within the original action*” in which the judgment was first obtained. [UTAH CODE § 78B-6-1802](#) (emphasis added).

. . . . Indeed, the Act explains that if a district court grants a motion to renew a judgment, the district court's order serves to “renew[ ] the original judgment” for the same amount of time as the original judgment. *Id.* § 78B-6-1804.

- In *Brady v. Park*, 2013 UT App 97, the Utah Court of Appeals held:

Compound interest is defined as “interest paid on both the principal and the previously accumulated interest.” *Black's Law Dictionary* 887 (9th ed. 2009). “ ‘Compound interest means interest on interest, in that accrued interest is added periodically to the principal, and interest is computed upon the new principal thus formed....’ ” [Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale](#), 783 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (quoting [45 Am.Jur.2d Interest and Usury § 76 \(1969\)](#)). ¶16.

“Compound interest is not favored by the law.” [Watkins & Faber v. Whiteley](#), 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979) (per curiam); see also [City of Hildale v. Cooke](#), 2001 UT 56, ¶ 36, 28 P.3d 697 (noting that a trial court “properly follow[ed] our previous determination that the law disfavors compound interest.”); [Christensen v. Munns](#), 812 P.2d 69, 71 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (noting “the general disinclination of the courts to allow

compound interest....” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
¶17

Accordingly, compound interest will be awarded only where “the parties expressly agreed to compound interest.” [Mountain States Broadcasting, 783 P.2d at 555](#). ¶17

The new Rule 58C states:

- (a) Motion.** A judgment creditor may renew a judgment by filing a motion under Rule 7 in the original action before the statute of limitations on the original judgment expires. A copy of the judgment must be filed with the motion.
- (b) Affidavit.** The motion must be supported by an affidavit:
- (b)(1) accounting for the original judgment and all post-judgment payments, credits, and other adjustments provided for by law or contained in the original judgment; and
  - (b)(2) affirming that notice was sent to the most current address known for the judgment debtor, stating what efforts the creditor has made to determine whether it is the debtor's correct address.
- (c) Effective date of renewed judgment.** If the court grants the motion, the court will enter an order renewing the original judgment from the date of entry of the order or from the scheduled expiration date of the original judgment, whichever occurs first. The statute of limitations on the renewed judgment runs from the date the order is signed and entered.

The most common practice for collection company plaintiffs is to add accrued interest to the principal for the renewed judgment, just as was done under the former procedure when a new case was filed. Under the new procedure set forth in UCA §78B-6-1801 et. seq., I think that is error resulting in compounded interest in the same case. Prohibiting the addition of accrued interest to a new principal amount would also prevent plaintiffs from re-filing motions to renew in order to compound interest more frequently although the filing fee set forth in UCA §78A-2-301(1)(l) would likely discourage frequent filers.

For the above-stated reasons, where the renewal of judgment is in the same, original case, Rule 58C should specifically disallow accrued interest to be added to the principal when renewing a judgment, however, the accrued interest may be renewed as well, but stated as a separate amount. In the alternative, the new Rule 58C should explicitly state that accrued interest shall (should) be included in the new principal amount. We just need clear direction.

1 **Rule 58C. Motion to renew judgment.**

2 **(a) Motion.** A judgment creditor may renew a judgment by filing a motion under Rule 7 in the original  
3 action before the statute of limitations on the original judgment expires. A copy of the judgment must be  
4 filed with the motion.

5 **(b) Affidavit.** The motion must be supported by an affidavit:

6 (b)(1) accounting for the original judgment and all post-judgment payments, credits, and other  
7 adjustments provided for by law or contained in the original judgment; and

8 (b)(2) affirming that notice was sent to the most current address known for the judgment debtor,  
9 stating what efforts the creditor has made to determine whether it is the debtor's correct address.


10 **(c) Effective date of renewed judgment.** If the court grants the motion, the court will enter an order  
11 renewing the original judgment from the date of entry of the order or from the scheduled expiration date of  
12 the original judgment, whichever occurs first. The statute of limitations on the renewed judgment runs  
13 from the date the order is signed and entered.

14 **Advisory Committee Note**

15 The Renewal of Judgment Act (Utah Code Sections 78B-6-1801 through 78B-6-1804) allows a  
16 domestic judgment to be renewed by motion, and Section 78B-5-302 governs domesticating a foreign  
17 judgment, which can then be renewed by motion. The statute of limitations on an action for failure to pay  
18 a judgment is governed by Section 78B-2-311.

19

# Tab 4



# Administrative Office of the Courts

Chief Justice Matthew B. Durrant  
Utah Supreme Court  
Chair, Utah Judicial Council

## MEMORANDUM

Daniel J. Becker  
State Court Administrator  
Raymond H. Wahl  
Deputy Court Administrator

**To:** Civil Rules Committee  
**From:** Nancy Sylvester  
**Date:** June 16, 2016  
**Re:** Rule 35 Report

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Nancy D. Sylvester". The signature is written in black ink on a light-colored background.

At its April meeting, the committee discussed Rule 35 and how it interacts with an expert's report under Rule 26. The committee heard from both Peter Summerill (personal injury plaintiffs' attorney) and David Bridge (insurance defense attorney) on this issue. A subcommittee consisting of Trystan Smith, Judge James Blanch, and Barbara Townsend then met to study it and craft language that would be a compromise between the disparate interests of the plaintiffs' and defense bars. The areas they grappled with were whether to impose a time frame on issuing the Rule 35 report and whether the report may also be considered an expert report under Rule 26.

The subcommittee recommends a 28 day turn around on the medical report. The subcommittee's note at lines 41 to 52 then discusses the interplay between the Rule 26 and Rule 35 reports. The note in essence says the Rule 35 report is not a Rule 26 expert report and does not have the same requirements attached. But it could count as both if the party elects to include the same expert disclosures.

**The mission of the Utah judiciary is to provide the people an open, fair,  
efficient, and independent system for the advancement of justice under the law.**

1       **Rule 35. Physical and mental examination of persons.**

2       **(a) Order for examination.** When the mental or physical condition or attribute of a party or of a  
 3 person in the custody or control of a party is in controversy, the court may order the party to submit to a  
 4 physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner or to produce for examination  
 5 the person in the party's custody or control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause  
 6 shown. All papers related to the motion and notice of any hearing ~~shall~~must be served on a nonparty to  
 7 be examined. The order ~~shall~~must specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the  
 8 examination and the person by whom the examination is to be made. The person being examined may  
 9 record the examination by audio or video means unless the party requesting the examination shows that  
 10 the recording would unduly interfere with the examination.

11       **(b) Report.** The party requesting the examination ~~shall~~must disclose a detailed written report of the  
 12 examiner, within 28 days after the examination, setting out the examiner's findings, including results of all  
 13 tests performed~~made~~, diagnoses, and other matters that would routinely be included in an examination  
 14 record generated ~~report~~ by a medical professional. ~~conclusions~~. If the party requesting the examination  
 15 wishes to call the examiner as an expert witness, the party ~~shall~~must disclose the examiner as an expert  
 16 as required by Rule ~~26(a)(3)~~, 26(a)(4).

17       **(c) Sanctions.** If a party or a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party fails to obey  
 18 an order entered under paragraph (a), the court on motion may take any action authorized by Rule  
 19 ~~37(e)~~, 37(b), except that the failure cannot be treated as contempt of court.

20       **Advisory Committee Notes**

21       Rule 35 has been substantially revised. A medical examination is not a matter of right, but should only  
 22 be permitted by the trial court upon a showing of good cause. Rule 35 has always provided, and still  
 23 provides, that the proponent of an examination must demonstrate good cause for the examination. And,  
 24 as before, the motion and order should detail the specifics of the proposed examination.

25       The parties and the trial court should refrain from the use of the phrase "independent medical  
 26 examiner," using instead the neutral appellation "medical examiner," "Rule 35 examiner," or the like.

27       The ~~C~~committee has determined that the benefits of recording generally outweigh the downsides in a  
 28 typical case. The amended rule therefore provides that recording shall be permitted as a matter of course  
 29 unless the person moving for the examination demonstrates the recording would unduly interfere with the  
 30 examination.

31       Nothing in the rule requires that the recording be conducted by a professional, and it is not the intent  
 32 of the committee that this extra cost should be necessary. The committee also recognizes that recording  
 33 may require the presence of a third party to manage the recording equipment, but this must be done  
 34 without interference and as unobtrusively as possible.

35       The former requirement of Rule 35(c) providing for the production of prior reports on other examinees  
 36 by the examiner was a source of great confusion and controversy. It is the ~~C~~committee's view that this  
 37 provision is better eliminated, and in the amended rule there is no longer an automatic requirement for the


38 | production of prior reports of other examinations. ~~Medical examiners will be treated as other expert~~  
39 | ~~witnesses are treated, with the required disclosure under Rule 26 and the option of a report or a~~  
40 | ~~deposition.~~

41 | A report must be provided for all medical examinations under this rule. The Rule 35 report is  
42 | expected to include the same type of content and observations that would be included in a medical record  
43 | generated by a competent medical professional following an examination of a patient, but need not  
44 | otherwise include the matters required to be included in a Rule 26(a)(4) expert report. If the medical  
45 | examiner is going to be called as an expert witness at trial, then the designation and disclosures under  
46 | Rule 26(a)(4) also are required, and the opposing party has the option of requiring, in addition to the Rule  
47 | 35(b) report, the expert's report or deposition under Rule 26(a)(4)(C). Nothing in these rules would  
48 | preclude a party who furnishes a report under Rule 35 from also including within it the expert disclosures  
49 | required under Rule 26(a)(4), in order to avoid the potential need to generate a separate Rule 26 (a)(4)  
50 | report later if the opposing party elects a report rather than a deposition. But submitting such a combined  
51 | report will not limit the opposing party's ability to elect a deposition if the Rule 35 examiner is designated  
52 | as an expert.

53



# Tab 5



# Administrative Office of the Courts

Chief Justice Matthew B. Durrant  
Utah Supreme Court  
Chair, Utah Judicial Council

## MEMORANDUM

Daniel J. Becker  
State Court Administrator  
Raymond H. Wahl  
Deputy Court Administrator

**To:** Civil Rules Committee  
**From:** Nancy Sylvester  
**Date:** May 26, 2016  
**Re:** Rule 34

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Nancy D. Sylvester". The signature is written in black ink on a light-colored background.

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At the May meeting, the committee took up a proposed change to Rule 34(b)(2) based on the 2015 federal amendments to the same paragraph. The committee expressed concerns about adopting the federal amendments since the rule had so recently been amended. At the recommendation of Terrie McIntosh, the committee instead determined that it should keep paragraph (b)(2) as is, but look at whether adding some of the federal language made sense.

The committee added a specificity requirement in line 23 and in lines 24-25 a portion of federal rule 34(b)(2)(C) dealing with the basis for an objection to production. The committee additionally determined that the following sentence from the federal note added some needed clarification in lines 25-26: "An objection that states the limits that have controlled the search for responsive and relevant materials qualifies as a statement that the materials have been withheld." The committee's requested amendments are in the attached draft.

**The mission of the Utah judiciary is to provide the people an open, fair,  
efficient, and independent system for the advancement of justice under the law.**

1       **Rule 34. Production of documents and things and entry upon land for inspection and other**  
2 **purposes.**

3       **(a) Scope.**

4           (a)(1) Any party may serve on any other party a request to produce and permit the requesting  
5 party to inspect, copy, test or sample any designated discoverable documents, electronically stored  
6 information or tangible things (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound  
7 recordings, images, and other data or data compilations stored in any medium from which information  
8 can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent into reasonably usable form) in the  
9 possession or control of the responding party.

10          (a)(2) Any party may serve on any other party a request to permit entry upon designated property  
11 in the possession or control of the responding party for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,  
12 surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any designated discoverable object or  
13 operation on the property.

14       **(b) Procedure and limitations.**

15           (b)(1) The request shall identify the items to be inspected by individual item or by category, and  
16 describe each item and category with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable  
17 date, time, place, and manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts. The request  
18 may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced.

19           (b)(2) The responding party shall serve a written response within 28 days after service of the  
20 request. The responding party shall restate each request before responding to it. The response shall  
21 state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection and related acts will be permitted as  
22 requested, or that the request is objected to. If the party objects to a request, the party must state the  
23 reasons for the objection with specificity. Any reason not stated is waived unless excused by the court  
24 for good cause. An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the  
25 basis of that objection. An objection that states the limits that have controlled the search for  
26 responsive and relevant materials qualifies as a statement that the materials have been withheld. The  
27 party shall identify and permit inspection of any part of a request that is not objectionable. If the party  
28 objects to the requested form or forms for producing electronically stored information—or if no form  
29 was specified in the request—the responding party must state the form or forms it intends to use.

30       **(c) Form of documents and electronically stored information.**

31           (c)(1) A party who produces documents for inspection shall produce them as they are kept in the  
32 usual course of business or shall organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the  
33 request.

34           (c)(2) If a request does not specify the form or forms for producing electronically stored  
35 information, a responding party must produce the information in a form or forms in which it is  
36 ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable.

37           (c)(3) A party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form.

38       Advisory Committee Notes

39       The 2016 amendments to paragraph (b)(2) adopt the specificity requirement in the 2015 amendments  
40 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(B), as well as some clarifying language from the federal note.

United States Code Annotated

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (Refs & Annos)

Title V. Disclosures and Discovery (Refs & Annos)

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 34

Rule 34. Producing Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and  
Tangible Things, or Entering Onto Land, for Inspection and Other Purposes

Currentness

**(a) In General.** A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of [Rule 26\(b\)](#):

(1) to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control:

(A) any designated documents or electronically stored information--including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations--stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form; or

(B) any designated tangible things; or

(2) to permit entry onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding party, so that the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property or any designated object or operation on it.

**(b) Procedure.**

(1) *Contents of the Request.* The request:

(A) must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected;

(B) must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection and for performing the related acts; and

(C) may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced.

(2) *Responses and Objections.*

(A) *Time to Respond.* The party to whom the request is directed must respond in writing within 30 days after being served or -- if the request was delivered under [Rule 26\(d\)\(2\)](#) -- within 30 days after the parties' first [Rule 26\(f\)](#) conference. A shorter or longer time may be stipulated to under [Rule 29](#) or be ordered by the court.

(B) *Responding to Each Item.* For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons. The responding party may state that it will produce copies of documents or of electronically stored information instead of permitting inspection. The production must then be completed no later than the time for inspection specified in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response.

(C) *Objections.* An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.

(D) *Responding to a Request for Production of Electronically Stored Information.* The response may state an objection to a requested form for producing electronically stored information. If the responding party objects to a requested form--or if no form was specified in the request--the party must state the form or forms it intends to use.

(E) *Producing the Documents or Electronically Stored Information.* Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, these procedures apply to producing documents or electronically stored information:

(i) A party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request;

(ii) If a request does not specify a form for producing electronically stored information, a party must produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms; and

(iii) A party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form.

(c) **Nonparties.** As provided in [Rule 45](#), a nonparty may be compelled to produce documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection.

#### **CREDIT(S)**

(Amended December 27, 1946, effective March 19, 1948; March 30, 1970, effective July 1, 1970; April 29, 1980, effective August 1, 1980; March 2, 1987, effective August 1, 1987; April 30, 1991, effective December 1, 1991; April 22, 1993, effective December 1, 1993; April 12, 2006, effective December 1, 2006; April 30, 2007, effective December 1, 2007; April 29, 2015, effective December 1, 2015.)

#### **ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES**

##### **1937 Adoption**

In England orders are made for the inspection of documents, *English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937)* O. 31, r.r. 14, et seq., or for the inspection of tangible property or for entry upon land, O. 50, r. 3. Michigan provides for inspection of damaged property when such damage is the ground of the action. Mich.Court Rules Ann. (Searl, 1933) Rule 41, § 2.

Practically all states have statutes authorizing the court to order parties in possession or control of documents to permit other parties to inspect and copy them before trial. See Ragland, *Discovery Before Trial* (1932) Appendix, p. 267, setting out the statutes.

Compare [former] Equity Rule 58 (Discovery--Interrogatories--Inspection and Production of Documents--Admission of Execution or Genuineness) (fifth paragraph).

### 1946 Amendment

**Note.** The changes in clauses (1) and (2) correlate the scope of inquiry permitted under Rule 34 with that provided in Rule 26(b), and thus remove any ambiguity created by the former differences in language. As stated in *Olson Transportation Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.*, E.D.Wis.1944, 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 34.41, Case 2, “\* \* \* Rule 34 is a direct and simple method of discovery.” At the same time the addition of the words following the term “parties” makes certain that the person in whose custody, possession, or control the evidence reposes may have the benefit of the applicable protective orders stated in Rule 30(b). This change should be considered in the light of the proposed expansion of Rule 30(b).

An objection has been made that the word “designated” in Rule 34 has been construed with undue strictness in some district court cases so as to require great and impracticable specificity in the description of documents, papers, books, etc., sought to be inspected. The Committee, however, believes that no amendment is needed, and that the proper meaning of “designated” as requiring specificity has already been delineated by the Supreme Court. See *Brown v. United States*, 1928, 48 S.Ct. 288, 276 U.S. 134, 143, 72 L.Ed. 500 (“The subpoena \* \* \* specifies \* \* \* with reasonable particularity the subjects to which the documents called for related.”); *Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont*, 1908, 28 S.Ct. 178, 207 U.S. 541, 543-544, 52 L.Ed. 327 (“We see no reason why all such books, papers and correspondence which related to the subject of inquiry, and were described with reasonable detail, should not be called for and the company directed to produce them. Otherwise, the State would be compelled to designate each particular paper which it desired, which presupposes an accurate knowledge of such papers, which the tribunal desiring the papers would probably rarely, if ever, have.”).

### 1970 Amendment

Rule 34 is revised to accomplish the following major changes in the existing rule: (1) to eliminate the requirement of good cause; (2) to have the rule operate extrajudicially; (3) to include testing and sampling as well as inspecting or photographing tangible things; and (4) to make clear that the rule does not preclude an independent action for analogous discovery against persons not parties.

**Subdivision (a).** Good cause is eliminated because it has furnished an uncertain and erratic protection to the parties from whom production is sought and is now rendered unnecessary by virtue of the more specific provisions added to Rule 26(b) relating to materials assembled in preparation for trial and to experts retained or consulted by parties.

The good cause requirement was originally inserted in Rule 34 as a general protective provision in the absence of experience with the specific problems that would arise thereunder. As the note to Rule 26(b)(3) on trial preparation materials makes clear, good cause has been applied differently to varying classes of documents, though not without confusion. It has often been said in court opinions that good cause requires a consideration of need for the materials and of alternative means of obtaining them, i.e., something more than relevance and lack of privilege. But the overwhelming proportion of the cases in which the formula of good cause has been applied to require a special showing are those involving trial preparation. In practice, the courts have not treated documents as having a special immunity to discovery simply because of their being documents. Protection may

be afforded to claims of privacy or secrecy or of undue burden or expense under what is now Rule 26(c) (previously Rule 30(b)). To be sure, an appraisal of “undue” burden inevitably entails consideration of the needs of the party seeking discovery. With special provisions added to govern trial preparation materials and experts, there is no longer any occasion to retain the requirement of good cause.

The revision of Rule 34 to have it operate extrajudicially, rather than by court order, is to a large extent a reflection of existing law office practice. The Columbia Survey shows that of the litigants seeking inspection of documents or things, only about 25 percent filed motions for court orders. This minor fraction nevertheless accounted for a significant number of motions. About half of these motions were uncontested and in almost all instances the party seeking production ultimately prevailed. Although an extrajudicial procedure will not drastically alter existing practice under Rule 34--it will conform to it in most cases--it has the potential of saving court time in a substantial though proportionately small number of cases tried annually.

The inclusion of testing and sampling of tangible things and objects or operations on land reflects a need frequently encountered by parties in preparation for trial. If the operation of a particular machine is the basis of a claim for negligent injury, it will often be necessary to test its operating parts or to sample and test the products it is producing. *Cf.* Mich.Gen.Ct.R. 310.1(1) (1963) (testing authorized).

The inclusive description of “documents” is revised to accord with changing technology. It makes clear that Rule 34 applies to electronics data compilations from which information can be obtained only with the use of detection devices, and that when the data can as a practical matter be made usable by the discovering party only through respondent's devices, respondent may be required to use his devices to translate the data into usable form. In many instances, this means that respondent will have to supply a print-out of computer data. The burden thus placed on respondent will vary from case to case, and the courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against undue burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering party pay costs. Similarly, if the discovering party needs to check the electronic source itself, the court may protect respondent with respect to preservation of his records, confidentiality of nondiscoverable matters, and costs.

**Subdivision (b).** The procedure provided in Rule 34 is essentially the same as that in Rule 33, as amended, and the discussion in the note appended to that rule is relevant to Rule 34 as well. Problems peculiar to Rule 34 relate to the specific arrangements that must be worked out for inspection and related acts of copying, photographing, testing, or sampling. The rule provides that a request for inspection shall set forth the items to be inspected either by item or category, describing each with reasonable particularity, and shall specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the inspection.

**Subdivision (c).** Rule 34 as revised continues to apply only to parties. Comments from the bar make clear that in the preparation of cases for trial it is occasionally necessary to enter land or inspect large tangible things in the possession of a person not a party, and that some courts have dismissed independent actions in the nature of bills in equity for such discovery on the ground that Rule 34 is preemptive. While an ideal solution to this problem is to provide for discovery against persons not parties in Rule 34, both the jurisdictional and procedural problems are very complex. For the present, this subdivision makes clear that Rule 34 does not preclude independent actions for discovery against persons not parties.

#### **1980 Amendment**

**Subdivision (b).** The Committee is advised that, “It is apparently not rare for parties deliberately to mix critical documents with others in the hope of obscuring significance.” *Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association* (1977) 22. The sentence added by this subdivision follows the recommendation of the *Report*.

#### **1987 Amendment**

The amendment is technical. No substantive change is intended.

### 1991 Amendment

This amendment reflects the change effected by revision of Rule 45 to provide for subpoenas to compel non-parties to produce documents and things and to submit to inspections of premises. The deletion of the text of the former paragraph is not intended to preclude an independent action for production of documents or things or for permission to enter upon land, but such actions may no longer be necessary in light of this revision.

### 1993 Amendment

The rule is revised to reflect the change made by Rule 26(d), preventing a party from seeking formal discovery prior to the meeting of the parties required by Rule 26(f). Also, like a change made in Rule 33, the rule is modified to make clear that, if a request for production is objectionable only in part, production should be afforded with respect to the unobjectionable portions.

When a case with outstanding requests for production is removed to federal court, the time for response would be measured from the date of the parties' meeting. See Rule 81(c), providing that these rules govern procedures after removal.

### 2006 Amendment

**Subdivision (a).** As originally adopted, Rule 34 focused on discovery of “documents” and “things.” In 1970, Rule 34(a) was amended to include discovery of data compilations, anticipating that the use of computerized information would increase. Since then, the growth in electronically stored information and in the variety of systems for creating and storing such information has been dramatic. Lawyers and judges interpreted the term “documents” to include electronically stored information because it was obviously improper to allow a party to evade discovery obligations on the basis that the label had not kept pace with changes in information technology. But it has become increasingly difficult to say that all forms of electronically stored information, many dynamic in nature, fit within the traditional concept of a “document.” Electronically stored information may exist in dynamic databases and other forms far different from fixed expression on paper. Rule 34(a) is amended to confirm that discovery of electronically stored information stands on equal footing with discovery of paper documents. The change clarifies that Rule 34 applies to information that is fixed in a tangible form and to information that is stored in a medium from which it can be retrieved and examined. At the same time, a Rule 34 request for production of “documents” should be understood to encompass, and the response should include, electronically stored information unless discovery in the action has clearly distinguished between electronically stored information and “documents.”

Discoverable information often exists in both paper and electronic form, and the same or similar information might exist in both. The items listed in Rule 34(a) show different ways in which information may be recorded or stored. Images, for example, might be hard-copy documents or electronically stored information. The wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity of technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise definition of electronically stored information. Rule 34(a)(1) is expansive and includes any type of information that is stored electronically. A common example often sought in discovery is electronic communications, such as e-mail. The rule covers -- either as documents or as electronically stored information -- information “stored in any medium,” to encompass future developments in computer technology. Rule 34(a)(1) is intended to be broad enough to cover all current types of computer-based information, and flexible enough to encompass future changes and developments.

References elsewhere in the rules to “electronically stored information” should be understood to invoke this expansive approach. A companion change is made to Rule 33(d), making it explicit that parties choosing to respond to an interrogatory by permitting access to responsive records may do so by providing access to electronically stored information. More generally, the term used in Rule 34(a)(1) appears in a number of other amendments, such as those to Rules 26(a)(1), 26(b)(2), 26(b)(5)(B), 26(f), 34(b), 37(f), and 45. In each of these rules, electronically stored information has the same broad meaning it has under Rule 34(a)(1).



References to “documents” appear in discovery rules that are not amended, including Rules 30(f), 36(a), and 37(c)(2). These references should be interpreted to include electronically stored information as circumstances warrant.

The term “electronically stored information” is broad, but whether material that falls within this term should be produced, and in what form, are separate questions that must be addressed under Rules 26(b), 26(c), and 34(b).

The Rule 34(a) requirement that, if necessary, a party producing electronically stored information translate it into reasonably usable form does not address the issue of translating from one human language to another. *See In re Puerto Rico Elect. Power Auth.*, 687 F.2d 501, 504-510 (1st Cir. 1989).

Rule 34(a)(1) is also amended to make clear that parties may request an opportunity to test or sample materials sought under the rule in addition to inspecting and copying them. That opportunity may be important for both electronically stored information and hard-copy materials. The current rule is not clear that such testing or sampling is authorized; the amendment expressly permits it. As with any other form of discovery, issues of burden and intrusiveness raised by requests to test or sample can be addressed under Rules 26(b)(2) and 26(c). Inspection or testing of certain types of electronically stored information or of a responding party's electronic information system may raise issues of confidentiality or privacy. The addition of testing and sampling to Rule 34(a) with regard to documents and electronically stored information is not meant to create a routine right of direct access to a party's electronic information system, although such access might be justified in some circumstances. Courts should guard against undue intrusiveness resulting from inspecting or testing such systems.

Rule 34(a)(1) is further amended to make clear that tangible things must -- like documents and land sought to be examined -- be designated in the request.

**Subdivision (b).** Rule 34(b) provides that a party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the discovery request. The production of electronically stored information should be subject to comparable requirements to protect against deliberate or inadvertent production in ways that raise unnecessary obstacles for the requesting party. Rule 34(b) is amended to ensure similar protection for electronically stored information.

The amendment to Rule 34(b) permits the requesting party to designate the form or forms in which it wants electronically stored information produced. The form of production is more important to the exchange of electronically stored information than of hard-copy materials, although a party might specify hard copy as the requested form. Specification of the desired form or forms may facilitate the orderly, efficient, and cost-effective discovery of electronically stored information. The rule recognizes that different forms of production may be appropriate for different types of electronically stored information. Using current technology, for example, a party might be called upon to produce word processing documents, e-mail messages, electronic spreadsheets, different image or sound files, and material from databases. Requiring that such diverse types of electronically stored information all be produced in the same form could prove impossible, and even if possible could increase the cost and burdens of producing and using the information. The rule therefore provides that the requesting party may ask for different forms of production for different types of electronically stored information.

The rule does not require that the requesting party choose a form or forms of production. The requesting party may not have a preference. In some cases, the requesting party may not know what form the producing party uses to maintain its electronically stored information, although Rule 26(f)(3) is amended to call for discussion of the form of production in the parties' prediscovery conference.

The responding party also is involved in determining the form of production. In the written response to the production request that Rule 34 requires, the responding party must state the form it intends to use for producing electronically stored information if the requesting party does not specify a form or if the responding party objects to a form that the requesting party specifies. Stating the intended form before the production occurs may permit the parties to identify and seek to resolve disputes before

the expense and work of the production occurs. A party that responds to a discovery request by simply producing electronically stored information in a form of its choice, without identifying that form in advance of the production in the response required by Rule 34(b), runs a risk that the requesting party can show that the produced form is not reasonably usable and that it is entitled to production of some or all of the information in an additional form. Additional time might be required to permit a responding party to assess the appropriate form or forms of production.

If the requesting party is not satisfied with the form stated by the responding party, or if the responding party has objected to the form specified by the requesting party, the parties must meet and confer under Rule 37(a)(2)(B) in an effort to resolve the matter before the requesting party can file a motion to compel. If they cannot agree and the court resolves the dispute, the court is not limited to the forms initially chosen by the requesting party, stated by the responding party, or specified in this rule for situations in which there is no court order or party agreement.

If the form of production is not specified by party agreement or court order, the responding party must produce electronically stored information either in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable. Rule 34(a) requires that, if necessary, a responding party “translate” information it produces into a “reasonably usable” form. Under some circumstances, the responding party may need to provide some reasonable amount of technical support, information on application software, or other reasonable assistance to enable the requesting party to use the information. The rule does not require a party to produce electronically stored information in the form in which it is ordinarily maintained, as long as it is produced in a reasonably usable form. But the option to produce in a reasonably usable form does not mean that a responding party is free to convert electronically stored information from the form in which it is ordinarily maintained to a different form that makes it more difficult or burdensome for the requesting party to use the information efficiently in the litigation. If the responding party ordinarily maintains the information it is producing in a way that makes it searchable by electronic means, the information should not be produced in a form that removes or significantly degrades this feature.

Some electronically stored information may be ordinarily maintained in a form that is not reasonably usable by any party. One example is “legacy” data that can be used only by superseded systems. The questions whether a producing party should be required to convert such information to a more usable form, or should be required to produce it at all, should be addressed under Rule 26(b)(2)(B).

Whether or not the requesting party specified the form of production, Rule 34(b) provides that the same electronically stored information ordinarily need be produced in only one form.

### **2007 Amendment**

The language of Rule 34 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.

The final sentence in the first paragraph of former Rule 34(b) was a redundant cross-reference to the discovery moratorium provisions of Rule 26(d). Rule 26(d) is now familiar, obviating any need to carry forward the redundant cross-reference.

The redundant reminder of Rule 37(a) procedure in the second paragraph of former Rule 34(b) is omitted as no longer useful.

### **2015 Amendment**

Several amendments are made in Rule 34, aimed at reducing the potential to impose unreasonable burdens by objections to requests to produce.

Rule 34(b)(2)(A) is amended to fit with new Rule 26(d)(2). The time to respond to a Rule 34 request delivered before the parties' Rule 26(f) conference is 30 days after the first Rule 26(f) conference.

Rule 34(b)(2)(B) is amended to require that objections to Rule 34 requests be stated with specificity. This provision adopts the language of Rule 33(b)(4), eliminating any doubt that less specific objections might be suitable under Rule 34. The specificity of the objection ties to the new provision in Rule 34(b)(2)(C) directing that an objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection may state that a request is overbroad, but if the objection recognizes that some part of the request is appropriate the objection should state the scope that is not overbroad. Examples would be a statement that the responding party will limit the search to documents or electronically stored information created within a given period of time prior to the events in suit, or to specified sources. When there is such an objection, the statement of what has been withheld can properly identify as matters “withheld” anything beyond the scope of the search specified in the objection.

Rule 34(b)(2)(B) is further amended to reflect the common practice of producing copies of documents or electronically stored information rather than simply permitting inspection. The response to the request must state that copies will be produced. The production must be completed either by the time for inspection specified in the request or by another reasonable time specifically identified in the response. When it is necessary to make the production in stages the response should specify the beginning and end dates of the production.

Rule 34(b)(2)(C) is amended to provide that an objection to a Rule 34 request must state whether anything is being withheld on the basis of the objection. This amendment should end the confusion that frequently arises when a producing party states several objections and still produces information, leaving the requesting party uncertain whether any relevant and responsive information has been withheld on the basis of the objections. The producing party does not need to provide a detailed description or log of all documents withheld, but does need to alert other parties to the fact that documents have been withheld and thereby facilitate an informed discussion of the objection. An objection that states the limits that have controlled the search for responsive and relevant materials qualifies as a statement that the materials have been “withheld.”

#### [Notes of Decisions \(1424\)](#)


Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 34, 28 U.S.C.A., FRCP Rule 34  
Including Amendments Received Through 2-1-16

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# Tab 6




# Administrative Office of the Courts

Chief Justice Matthew B. Durrant  
Utah Supreme Court  
Chair, Utah Judicial Council

## MEMORANDUM

Daniel J. Becker  
State Court Administrator  
Raymond H. Wahl  
Deputy Court Administrator

**To:** Civil Rules Committee  
**From:** Nancy Sylvester   
**Date:** April 22, 2016  
**Re:** Rule 37

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The 2015 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) address failure to preserve electronically stored information. The committee determined at its March meeting that Utah should adopt the federal amendments. Utah's rule 37(e), though, addresses not only electronically stored information, but also other, non-electronically stored information. I have taken the federal language and merged it into Utah's language so that the rule continues to address the non-electronically stored information and now better addresses the electronically stored information.

**The mission of the Utah judiciary is to provide the people an open, fair,  
efficient, and independent system for the advancement of justice under the law.**

1 **Rule 37. Statement of discovery issues; Sanctions; Failure to admit, to attend deposition or to**  
2 **preserve evidence.**

3 **(a) Statement of discovery issues.**

4 (a)(1) A party or the person from whom discovery is sought may request that the judge enter an  
5 order regarding any discovery issue, including:

6 (a)(1)(A) failure to disclose under Rule [26](#);

7 (a)(1)(B) extraordinary discovery under Rule [26](#);

8 (a)(1)(C) a subpoena under Rule [45](#);

9 (a)(1)(D) protection from discovery; or

10 (a)(1)(E) compelling discovery from a party who fails to make full and complete discovery.

11 **(a)(2) Statement of discovery issues length and content.** The statement of discovery issues  
12 must be no more than 4 pages, not including permitted attachments, and must include in the following  
13 order:

14 (a)(2)(A) the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought stated succinctly and with  
15 particularity;

16 (a)(2)(B) a certification that the requesting party has in good faith conferred or attempted to  
17 confer with the other affected parties in person or by telephone in an effort to resolve the dispute  
18 without court action;

19 (a)(2)(C) a statement regarding proportionality under Rule [26\(b\)\(2\)](#); and

20 (a)(2)(D) if the statement requests extraordinary discovery, a statement certifying that the  
21 party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget.

22 **(a)(3) Objection length and content.** No more than 7 days after the statement is filed, any other  
23 party may file an objection to the statement of discovery issues. The objection must be no more than  
24 4 pages, not including permitted attachments, and must address the issues raised in the statement.

25 **(a)(4) Permitted attachments.** The party filing the statement must attach to the statement only a  
26 copy of the disclosure, request for discovery or the response at issue.

27 **(a)(5) Proposed order.** Each party must file a proposed order concurrently with its statement or  
28 objection.

29 **(a)(6) Decision.** Upon filing of the objection or expiration of the time to do so, either party may  
30 and the party filing the statement must file a Request to Submit for Decision under Rule [7\(g\)](#). The  
31 court will promptly:

32 (a)(6)(A) decide the issues on the pleadings and papers;

33 (a)(6)(B) conduct a hearing by telephone conference or other electronic communication; or

34 (a)(6)(C) order additional briefing and establish a briefing schedule.

35 **(a)(7) Orders.** The court may enter orders regarding disclosure or discovery or to protect a party or  
36 person from discovery being conducted in bad faith or from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or  
37 undue burden or expense, or to achieve proportionality under Rule [26\(b\)\(2\)](#), including one or more of the  
38 following:

39 (a)(7)(A) that the discovery not be had or that additional discovery be had;

40 (a)(7)(B) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a  
41 designation of the time or place;

42 (a)(7)(C) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that  
43 selected by the party seeking discovery;

44 (a)(7)(D) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited  
45 to certain matters;

46 (a)(7)(E) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the  
47 court;

48 (a)(7)(F) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;

49 (a)(7)(G) that a trade secret or other confidential information not be disclosed or be disclosed  
50 only in a designated way;

51 (a)(7)(H) that the parties simultaneously deliver specified documents or information enclosed  
52 in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court;

53 (a)(7)(I) that a question about a statement or opinion of fact or the application of law to fact  
54 not be answered until after designated discovery has been completed or until a pretrial  
55 conference or other later time;

56 (a)(7)(J) that the costs, expenses and attorney fees of discovery be allocated among the  
57 parties as justice requires; or

58 (a)(7)(K) that a party pay the reasonable costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred on  
59 account of the statement of discovery issues if the relief requested is granted or denied, or if a  
60 party provides discovery or withdraws a discovery request after a statement of discovery issues is  
61 filed and if the court finds that the party, witness, or attorney did not act in good faith or asserted a  
62 position that was not substantially justified.

63 **(a)(8) Request for sanctions prohibited.** A statement of discovery issues or an objection may  
64 include a request for costs, expenses and attorney fees but not a request for sanctions.

65 **(a)(9) Statement of discovery issues does not toll discovery time.** A statement of discovery  
66 issues does not suspend or toll the time to complete standard discovery.

67 **(b) Motion for sanctions.** Unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the court,  
68 upon motion, may impose appropriate sanctions for the failure to follow its orders, including the following:

69 (b)(1) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established in accordance with the  
70 claim or defense of the party obtaining the order;

71 (b)(2) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses  
72 or from introducing designated matters into evidence;

73 (b)(3) stay further proceedings until the order is obeyed;

74 (b)(4) dismiss all or part of the action, strike all or part of the pleadings, or render judgment by  
75 default on all or part of the action;

76 (b)(5) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable costs, expenses, and attorney fees,  
77 caused by the failure;

78 (b)(6) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a physical or mental  
79 examination, as contempt of court; and

80 (b)(7) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference.

81 **(c) Motion for costs, expenses and attorney fees on failure to admit.** If a party fails to admit the  
82 genuineness of a document or the truth of a matter as requested under Rule [36](#), and if the party  
83 requesting the admissions proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the party  
84 requesting the admissions may file a motion for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable

85 costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred in making that proof. The court must enter the order unless it  
86 finds that:

87 (c)(1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule [36\(a\)](#);

88 (c)(2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance;

89 (c)(3) there were reasonable grounds to believe that the party failing to admit might prevail on the  
90 matter;

91 (c)(4) that the request was not proportional under Rule [26\(b\)\(2\)](#); or

92 (c)(5) there were other good reasons for the failure to admit.

93 **(d) Motion for sanctions for failure of party to attend deposition.** If a party or an officer, director,  
94 or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule [30\(b\)\(6\)](#) to testify on behalf of a party  
95 fails to appear before the officer taking the deposition after service of the notice, any other party may file a  
96 motion for sanctions under paragraph (b). The failure to appear may not be excused on the ground that  
97 the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to appear has filed a statement of discovery  
98 issues under paragraph (a).

99 **(e) Failure to preserve evidence.** Nothing in this rule limits the inherent power of the court to take  
100 any action authorized by paragraph (b) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to  
101 preserve a document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty.

102 **(e)(1) Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored Information.** If electronically stored information  
103 that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party  
104 failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through additional  
105 discovery, the court:

106 (e)(1)(A) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may order  
107 measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or

108 (e)(1)(B) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the  
109 information's use in the litigation may:

110 (e)(1)(B)(1) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;

111 (e)(1)(B)(2) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable  
112 to the party; or

113 (e)(1)(B)(3) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.

114 (e)(1)(C) Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these  
115 rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the  
116 routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.

### 117 **Advisory Committee Notes**

118 **New note (add to Advisory Committee Notes):**

119 The 2016 amendments to paragraph (e) merged the 2015 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil  
120 Procedure 37(e). The federal amendments "addressed the serious problems resulting from the continued  
121 exponential growth in the volume of [electronically-stored] information" by providing "measures a court  
122 may employ if information that should have been preserved is lost." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, Advisory  
123 Committee Notes, 2015 Amendment. Unlike the federal rule, Utah's rule 37(e) also addressed non-  
124 electronically stored evidence. The committee preserved the language addressing that subject.

125



United States Code Annotated

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (Refs & Annos)

Title V. Disclosures and Discovery (Refs & Annos)

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 37

Rule 37. Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions

Currentness

**(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery.**

**(1) *In General.*** On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.

**(2) *Appropriate Court.*** A motion for an order to a party must be made in the court where the action is pending. A motion for an order to a nonparty must be made in the court where the discovery is or will be taken.

**(3) *Specific Motions.***

**(A) *To Compel Disclosure.*** If a party fails to make a disclosure required by [Rule 26\(a\)](#), any other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions.

**(B) *To Compel a Discovery Response.*** A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection. This motion may be made if:

**(i)** a deponent fails to answer a question asked under [Rule 30](#) or [31](#);

**(ii)** a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under [Rule 30\(b\)\(6\)](#) or [31\(a\)\(4\)](#);

**(iii)** a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under [Rule 33](#); or

**(iv)** a party fails to produce documents or fails to respond that inspection will be permitted -- or fails to permit inspection -- as requested under [Rule 34](#).

**(C) *Related to a Deposition.*** When taking an oral deposition, the party asking a question may complete or adjourn the examination before moving for an order.

**(4) *Evasive or Incomplete Disclosure, Answer, or Response.*** For purposes of this subdivision (a), an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.

**(5) *Payment of Expenses; Protective Orders.***

**(A) *If the Motion Is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery Is Provided After Filing).*** If the motion is granted--or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed--the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if:

- (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;
- (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or
- (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

**(B) *If the Motion Is Denied.*** If the motion is denied, the court may issue any protective order authorized under [Rule 26\(c\)](#) and must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party or deponent who opposed the motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not order this payment if the motion was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

**(C) *If the Motion Is Granted in Part and Denied in Part.*** If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may issue any protective order authorized under [Rule 26\(c\)](#) and may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.

**(b) *Failure to Comply with a Court Order.***

**(1) *Sanctions Sought in the District Where the Deposition Is Taken.*** If the court where the discovery is taken orders a deponent to be sworn or to answer a question and the deponent fails to obey, the failure may be treated as contempt of court. If a deposition-related motion is transferred to the court where the action is pending, and that court orders a deponent to be sworn or to answer a question and the deponent fails to obey, the failure may be treated as contempt of either the court where the discovery is taken or the court where the action is pending.

**(2) *Sanctions Sought in the District Where the Action Is Pending.***

**(A) *For Not Obeying a Discovery Order.*** If a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent--or a witness designated under [Rule 30\(b\)\(6\)](#) or [31\(a\)\(4\)](#)--fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under [Rule 26\(f\)](#), [35](#), or [37\(a\)](#), the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the following:

(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims;

(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence;

(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;

(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;

(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;

(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or

(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.

**(B) For Not Producing a Person for Examination.** If a party fails to comply with an order under [Rule 35\(a\)](#) requiring it to produce another person for examination, the court may issue any of the orders listed in [Rule 37\(b\)\(2\)\(A\)\(i\)-\(vi\)](#), unless the disobedient party shows that it cannot produce the other person.

**(C) Payment of Expenses.** Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

**(c) Failure to Disclose, to Supplement an Earlier Response, or to Admit.**

**(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement.** If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by [Rule 26\(a\)](#) or [\(e\)](#), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:

**(A)** may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure;

**(B)** may inform the jury of the party's failure; and

**(C)** may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in [Rule 37\(b\)\(2\)\(A\)\(i\)-\(vi\)](#).

(2) **Failure to Admit.** If a party fails to admit what is requested under [Rule 36](#) and if the requesting party later proves a document to be genuine or the matter true, the requesting party may move that the party who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in making that proof. The court must so order unless:

(A) the request was held objectionable under [Rule 36\(a\)](#);

(B) the admission sought was of no substantial importance;

(C) the party failing to admit had a reasonable ground to believe that it might prevail on the matter; or

(D) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.

(d) **Party's Failure to Attend Its Own Deposition, Serve Answers to Interrogatories, or Respond to a Request for Inspection.**

(1) **In General.**

(A) **Motion; Grounds for Sanctions.** The court where the action is pending may, on motion, order sanctions if:

(i) a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent--or a person designated under [Rule 30\(b\)\(6\)](#) or [31\(a\)\(4\)](#)--fails, after being served with proper notice, to appear for that person's deposition; or

(ii) a party, after being properly served with interrogatories under [Rule 33](#) or a request for inspection under [Rule 34](#), fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response.

(B) **Certification.** A motion for sanctions for failing to answer or respond must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party failing to act in an effort to obtain the answer or response without court action.

(2) **Unacceptable Excuse for Failing to Act.** A failure described in [Rule 37\(d\)\(1\)\(A\)](#) is not excused on the ground that the discovery sought was objectionable, unless the party failing to act has a pending motion for a protective order under [Rule 26\(c\)](#).

(3) **Types of Sanctions.** Sanctions may include any of the orders listed in [Rule 37\(b\)\(2\)\(A\)\(i\)-\(vi\)](#). Instead of or in addition to these sanctions, the court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

**(e) Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored Information.** If electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court:

(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or

(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation may:

(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;

(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party; or

(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.

**(f) Failure to Participate in Framing a Discovery Plan.** If a party or its attorney fails to participate in good faith in developing and submitting a proposed discovery plan as required by [Rule 26\(f\)](#), the court may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require that party or attorney to pay to any other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure.

#### **CREDIT(S)**

(Amended December 29, 1948, effective October 20, 1949; March 30, 1970, effective July 1, 1970; April 29, 1980, effective August 1, 1980; amended by [Pub.L. 96-481, Title II, § 205\(a\)](#), October 21, 1980, 94 Stat. 2330, effective October 1, 1981; amended March 2, 1987, effective August 1, 1987; April 22, 1993, effective December 1, 1993; April 17, 2000, effective December 1, 2000; April 12, 2006, effective December 1, 2006; April 30, 2007, effective December 1, 2007; April 16, 2013, effective December 1, 2013; April 29, 2015, effective December 1, 2015.)

#### **ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES**

##### **1937 Adoption**

The provisions of this rule authorizing orders establishing facts or excluding evidence or striking pleadings, or authorizing judgments of dismissal or default, for refusal to answer questions or permit inspection or otherwise make discovery, are in accord with [Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 1909, 29 S.Ct. 370, 212 U.S. 322, 53 L.Ed. 530, 15 Ann.Cas. 645](#), which distinguishes between the justifiable use of such measures as a means of compelling the production of evidence, and their unjustifiable use, as in [Hovey v. Elliott, 1897, 17 S.Ct. 841, 167 U.S. 409, 42 L.Ed. 215](#), for the mere purpose of punishing for contempt.

##### **1948 Amendment**

The amendment effective October 1949, substituted the reference to “[Title 28, U.S.C., § 1783](#)” in subdivision (e) for the reference to “the Act of July 3, 1926, c. 762, § 1 (44 Stat. 835), [U.S.C., Title 28, § 711](#).”

##### **1970 Amendment**

Rule 37 provides generally for sanctions against parties or persons unjustifiably resisting discovery. Experience has brought to light a number of defects in the language of the rule as well as instances in which it is not serving the purposes for which it was designed. See Rosenberg, *Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery*, 58 Col.L.Rev. 480 (1958). In addition, changes being made in other discovery rules require conforming amendments to Rule 37.

Rule 37 sometimes refers to a “failure” to afford discovery and at other times to a “refusal” to do so. Taking note of this dual terminology, courts have imported into “refusal” a requirement of “wilfulness.” See *Roth v. Paramount Pictures Corp.*, 8 F.R.D. 31 (W.D.Pa.1948); *Campbell v. Johnson*, 101 F.Supp. 705, 707 (S.D.N.Y.1951). In *Societe Internationale v. Rogers*, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), the Supreme Court concluded that the rather random use of these two terms in Rule 37 showed no design to use them with consistently distinctive meanings, that “refused” in Rule 37(b)(2) meant simply a failure to comply, and that wilfulness was relevant only to the selection of sanctions, if any, to be imposed. Nevertheless, after the decision in *Societe*, the court in *Hinson v. Michigan Mutual Liability Co.*, 275 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1960) once again ruled that “refusal” required wilfulness. Substitution of “failure” for “refusal” throughout Rule 37 should eliminate this confusion and bring the rule into harmony with the *Societe Internationale* decision. See Rosenberg, *supra*, 58 Col.L.Rev. 480, 489-490 (1958).

**Subdivision (a).** Rule 37(a) provides relief to a party seeking discovery against one who, with or without stated objections, fails to afford the discovery sought. It has always fully served this function in relation to depositions, but the amendments being made to Rules 33 and 34 give Rule 37(a) added scope and importance. Under existing Rule 33, a party objecting to interrogatories must make a motion for court hearing on his objections. The changes now made in Rules 33 and 37(a) make it clear that the interrogating party must move to compel answers, and the motion is provided for in Rule 37(a). Existing Rule 34, since it requires a court order prior to production of documents or things or permission to enter on land, has no relation to Rule 37(a). Amendments of Rules 34 and 37(a) create a procedure similar to that provided for Rule 33.

**Subdivision (a)(1).** This is a new provision making clear to which court a party may apply for an order compelling discovery. Existing Rule 37(a) refers only to the court in which the deposition is being taken; nevertheless, it has been held that the court where the action is pending has “inherent power” to compel a party deponent to answer. *Lincoln Laboratories, Inc. v. Savage Laboratories, Inc.*, 27 F.R.D. 476 (D.Del.1961). In relation to Rule 33 interrogatories and Rule 34 requests for inspection, the court where the action is pending is the appropriate enforcing tribunal. The new provision eliminates the need to resort to inherent power by spelling out the respective roles of the court where the action is pending and the court where the deposition is taken. In some instances, two courts are available to a party seeking to compel answers from a party deponent. The party seeking discovery may choose the court to which he will apply, but the court has power to remit the party to the other court as a more appropriate forum.

**Subdivision (a)(2).** This subdivision contains the substance of existing provisions of Rule 37(a) authorizing motions to compel answers to questions put at depositions and to interrogatories. New provisions authorize motions for orders compelling designation under Rules 30(b)(6) and 31(a) and compelling inspection in accordance with a request made under Rule 34. If the court denies a motion, in whole or part, it may accompany the denial with issuance of a protective order. Compare the converse provision in Rule 26(c).

**Subdivision (a)(3).** This new provision makes clear that an evasive or incomplete answer is to be considered, for purposes of subdivision (a), a failure to answer. The courts have consistently held that they have the power to compel adequate answers. *E.g.*, *Cone Mills Corp. v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co.*, 33 F.R.D. 318 (D.Del.1963). This power is recognized and incorporated into the rule.

**Subdivision (a)(4).** This subdivision amends the provisions for award of expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party or person when a motion is made for an order compelling discovery. At present, an award of expenses is made only if the losing party or person is found to have acted without substantial justification. The change requires that expenses be awarded unless the conduct of the losing party or person is found to have been substantially justified. The test of “substantial

justification” remains, but the change in language is intended to encourage judges to be more alert to abuses occurring in the discovery process.

On many occasions, to be sure, the dispute over discovery between the parties is genuine, though ultimately resolved one way or the other by the court. In such cases, the losing party is substantially justified in carrying the matter to court. But the rules should deter the abuse implicit in carrying or forcing a discovery dispute to court when no genuine dispute exists. And the potential or actual imposition of expenses is virtually the sole formal sanction in the rules to deter a party from pressing to a court hearing frivolous requests for or objections to discovery.

The present provision of Rule 37(a) that the court shall require payment if it finds that the defeated party acted without “substantial justification” may appear adequate, but in fact it has been little used. Only a handful of reported cases include an award of expenses, and the Columbia Survey found that in only one instance out of about 50 motions decided under Rule 37(a) did the court award expenses. It appears that the courts do not utilize the most important available sanction to deter abusive resort to the judiciary.

The proposed change provides in effect that expenses should ordinarily be awarded unless a court finds that the losing party acted justifiably in carrying his point to court. At the same time, a necessary flexibility is maintained, since the court retains the power to find that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust--as where the prevailing party also acted unjustifiably. The amendment does not significantly narrow the discretion of the court, but rather presses the court to address itself to abusive practices. The present provision that expenses may be imposed upon either the party or his attorney or both is unchanged. But it is not contemplated that expenses will be imposed upon the attorney merely because the party is indigent.

**Subdivision (b).** This subdivision deals with sanctions for failure to comply with a court order. The present captions for subsections (1) and (2) entitled, “Contempt” and “Other Consequences,” respectively, are confusing. One of the consequences listed in (2) is the arrest of the party, representing the exercise of the contempt power. The contents of the subsections show that the first authorizes the sanction of contempt (and no other) by the court in which the deposition is taken, whereas the second subsection authorizes a variety of sanctions, including contempt, which may be imposed by the court in which the action is pending. The captions of the subsections are changed to reflect their contents.

The scope of Rule 37(b)(2) is broadened by extending it to include any order “to provide or permit discovery,” including orders issued under Rules 37(a) and 35. Various rules authorize orders for discovery--e.g., Rule 35(b)(1), Rule 26(c) as revised, Rule 37(d). See Rosenberg, *supra*, 58 Col.L.Rev. 480, 484-486. Rule 37(b)(2) should provide comprehensively for enforcement of all these orders. Cf. *Societe Internationale v. Rogers*, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958). On the other hand, the reference to Rule 34 is deleted to conform to the changed procedure in that rule.

A new subsection (E) provides that sanctions which have been available against a party for failure to comply with an order under Rule 35(a) to submit to examination will now be available against him for his failure to comply with a Rule 35(a) order to produce a third person for examination, unless he shows that he is unable to produce the person. In this context, “unable” means in effect “unable in good faith.” See *Societe Internationale v. Rogers*, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).

Subdivision (b)(2) is amplified to provide for payment of reasonable expenses caused by the failure to obey the order. Although Rules 37(b)(2) and 37(d) have been silent as to award of expenses, courts have nevertheless ordered them on occasion. E.g., *United Sheeplined Clothing Co. v. Arctic Fur Cap Corp.*, 165 F.Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y.1958); *Austin Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.*, 22 F.R.D. 302 (S.D.N.Y.1958). The provision places the burden on the disobedient party to avoid expenses by showing that his failure is justified or that special circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Allocating the burden in this way conforms to the changed provisions as to expenses in Rule 37(a), and is particularly appropriate when a court order is disobeyed.

An added reference to directors of a party is similar to a change made in subdivision (d) and is explained in the note to that subdivision. The added reference to persons designated by a party under Rules 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of the party carries out the new procedure in those rules for taking a deposition of a corporation or other organization.

**Subdivision (c).** Rule 37(c) provides a sanction for the enforcement of Rule 36 dealing with requests for admission. Rule 36 provides the mechanism whereby a party may obtain from another party in appropriate instances either (1) an admission, or (2) a sworn and specific denial or (3) a sworn statement “setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny.” If the party obtains the second or third of these responses, in proper form, Rule 36 does not provide for a pretrial hearing on whether the response is warranted by the evidence thus far accumulated. Instead, Rule 37(c) is intended to provide posttrial relief in the form of a requirement that the party improperly refusing the admission pay the expenses of the other side in making the necessary proof at trial.

Rule 37(c), as now written, addresses itself in terms only to the sworn denial and is silent with respect to the statement of reasons for an inability to admit or deny. There is no apparent basis for this distinction, since the sanction provided in Rule 37(c) should deter all unjustified failures to admit. This omission in the rule has caused confused and diverse treatment in the courts. One court has held that if a party give inadequate reasons, he should be treated before trial as having denied the request, so that Rule 37(c) may apply. *Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp.*, 15 F.R.D. 339 (E.D.N.Y.1954). Another has held that the party should be treated as having admitted the request. *Heng Hsin Co. v. Stern, Morgenthau & Co.*, 20 Fed.Rules Serv. 36a.52, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1954). Still another has ordered a new response, without indicating what the outcome should be if the new response were inadequate. *United States Plywood Corp. v. Hudson Lumber Co.*, 127 F.Supp. 489, 497-498 (S.D.N.Y.1954). See generally Finman, *The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure*, 71 Yale L.J. 371, 426-430 (1962). The amendment eliminates this defect in Rule 37(c) by bringing within its scope all failures to admit.

Additional provisions in Rule 37(c) protect a party from having to pay expenses if the request for admission was held objectionable under Rule 36(a) or if the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter. The latter provision emphasizes that the true test under Rule 37(c) is not whether a party prevailed at trial but whether he acted reasonably in believing that he might prevail.

**Subdivision (d).** The scope of subdivision (d) is broadened to include responses to requests for inspection under Rule 34, thereby conforming to the new procedures of Rule 34.

Two related changes are made in subdivision (d): the permissible sanctions are broadened to include such orders “as are just”; and the requirement that the failure to appear or respond be “wilful” is eliminated. Although Rule 37(d) in terms provides for only three sanctions, all rather severe, the courts have interpreted it as permitting softer sanctions than those which it sets forth. E.g., *Gill v. Stelow*, 240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.1957); *Saltzman v. Birrell*, 156 F.Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y.1957); 2A *Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure* 554-557 (Wright ed. 1961). The rule is changed to provide the greater flexibility as to sanctions which the cases show is needed.

The resulting flexibility as to sanctions eliminates any need to retain the requirement that the failure to appear or respond be “wilful.” The concept of “wilful failure” is at best subtle and difficult, and the cases do not supply a bright line. Many courts have imposed sanctions without referring to wilfulness. E.g., *Milewski v. Schneider Transportation Co.*, 238 F.2d 397 (6th Cir.1956); *Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Kentworth Corp.*, 7 F.R.D. 543 (W.D.Ky.1947). In addition, in view of the possibility of light sanctions, even a negligent failure should come within Rule 37(d). If default is caused by counsel's ignorance of Federal practice, cf. *Dunn v. Pa. R.R.*, 96 F.Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1951), or by his preoccupation with another aspect of the case, cf. *Maurer-Neuer, Inc. v. United Packinghouse Workers*, 26 F.R.D. 139 (D.Kans.1960), dismissal of the action and default judgment are not justified, but the imposition of expenses and fees may well be. “Wilfulness” continues to play a role, along with various other factors, in the choice of sanctions. Thus, the scheme conforms to Rule 37(b) as construed by the Supreme Court in *Societe Internationale v. Rogers*, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958).



A provision is added to make clear that a party may not properly remain completely silent even when he regards a notice to take his deposition or a set of interrogatories or requests to inspect as improper and objectionable. If he desires not to appear or not to respond, he must apply for a protective order. The cases are divided on whether a protective order must be sought. Compare *Collins v. Wayland*, 139 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1944), *cert. den.* 322 U.S. 744; *Bourgeois v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.*, 20 F.R.D. 358 (S.D.N.Y.1957); *Loosley v. Stone*, 15 F.R.D. 373 (S.D.Ill.1954), with *Scarlatos v. Kulukundis*, 21 F.R.D. 185 (S.D.N.Y.1957); *Ross v. True Temper Corp.*, 11 F.R.D. 307 (N.D.Ohio 1951). Compare also Rosenberg, *supra*, 58 Col.L.Rev. 480, 496 (1958) with 2A Barron & Holtzoff, *Federal Practice and Procedure* 530-531 (Wright ed. 1961). The party from whom discovery is sought is afforded, through Rule 26(c), a fair and effective procedure whereby he can challenge the request made. At the same time, the total noncompliance with which Rule 37(d) is concerned may impose severe inconvenience or hardship on the discovering party and substantially delay the discovery process. Cf. 2B Barron & Holtzoff, *Federal Practice and Procedure* 306-307 (Wright ed. 1961) (response to a subpoena).

The failure of an officer or managing agent of a party to make discovery as required by present Rule 37(d) is treated as the failure of the party. The rule as revised provides similar treatment for a director of a party. There is slight warrant for the present distinction between officers and managing agents on the one hand and directors on the other. Although the legal power over a director to compel his making discovery may not be as great as over officers or managing agents, *Campbell v. General Motors Corp.*, 13 F.R.D. 331 (S.D.N.Y.1952), the practical differences are negligible. That a director's interests are normally aligned with those of his corporation is shown by the provisions of old Rule 26(d)(2), transferred to 32(a)(2) (deposition of director of party may be used at trial by an adverse party for any purpose) and of Rule 43(b) (director of party may be treated at trial as a hostile witness on direct examination by any adverse party). Moreover, in those rare instances when a corporation is unable through good faith efforts to compel a director to make discovery, it is unlikely that the court will impose sanctions. Cf. *Societe Internationale v. Rogers*, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).

**Subdivision (e).** The change in the caption conforms to the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1783, as amended in 1964.

**Subdivision (f).** Until recently, costs of a civil action could be awarded against the United States only when expressly provided by Act of Congress, and such provision was rarely made. See H.R.Rep.No. 1535, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1966). To avoid any conflict with this doctrine, Rule 37(f) has provided that expenses and attorney's fees may not be imposed upon the United States under Rule 37. See 2A Barron & Holtzoff, *Federal Practice and Procedure* 857 (Wright ed. 1961).

A major change in the law was made in 1966, 80 Stat. 308, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1966), whereby a judgment for costs may ordinarily be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States. Costs are not to include the fees and expenses of attorneys. In light of this legislative development, Rule 37(f) is amended to permit the award of expenses and fees against the United States under Rule 37, but only to the extent permitted by statute. The amendment brings Rule 37(f) into line with present and future statutory provisions.

## 1980 Amendment

**Subdivision (b)(2).** New Rule 26(f) provides that if a discovery conference is held, at its close the court shall enter an order respecting the subsequent conduct of discovery. The amendment provides that the sanctions available for violation of other court orders respecting discovery are available for violation of the discovery conference order.

**Subdivision (e).** Subdivision (e) is stricken. Title 28, U.S.C. § 1783 no longer refers to sanctions. The subdivision otherwise duplicates Rule 45(e)(2).

**Subdivision (g).** New Rule 26(f) imposes a duty on parties to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement upon the request of any party. This subdivision authorizes the court to award to parties who participate in good faith in an attempt to frame a discovery plan the expenses incurred in the attempt if any party or his attorney fails to participate in good faith and thereby causes additional expense.

**Failure of United States to Participate in Good Faith in Discovery.** Rule 37 authorizes the court to direct that parties or attorneys who fail to participate in good faith in the discovery process pay the expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by other parties as a result of that failure. Since attorneys' fees cannot ordinarily be awarded against the United States (28 U.S.C. § 2412), there is often no practical remedy for the misconduct of its officers and attorneys. However, in the case of a government attorney who fails to participate in good faith in discovery, nothing prevents a court in an appropriate case from giving written notification of that fact to the Attorney General of the United States and other appropriate heads of offices or agencies thereof.

### 1987 Amendment

The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.

### 1993 Amendment

**Subdivision (a).** This subdivision is revised to reflect the revision of Rule 26(a), requiring disclosure of matters without a discovery request.

Pursuant to new subdivision (a)(2)(A), a party dissatisfied with the disclosure made by an opposing party may under this rule move for an order to compel disclosure. In providing for such a motion, the revised rule parallels the provisions of the former rule dealing with failures to answer particular interrogatories. Such a motion may be needed when the information to be disclosed might be helpful to the party seeking the disclosure but not to the party required to make the disclosure. If the party required to make the disclosure would need the material to support its own contentions, the more effective enforcement of the disclosure requirement will be to exclude the evidence not disclosed, as provided in subdivision (c)(1) of this revised rule.

Language is included in the new paragraph and added to the subparagraph (B) that requires litigants to seek to resolve discovery disputes by informal means before filing a motion with the court. This requirement is based on successful experience with similar local rules of court promulgated pursuant to Rule 83.

The last sentence of paragraph (2) is moved into paragraph (4).

Under revised paragraph (3), evasive or incomplete disclosures and responses to interrogatories and production requests are treated as failures to disclose or respond. Interrogatories and requests for production should not be read or interpreted in an artificially restrictive or hypertechnical manner to avoid disclosure of information fairly covered by the discovery request, and to do so is subject to appropriate sanctions under subdivision (a).

Revised paragraph (4) is divided into three subparagraphs for ease of reference, and in each the phrase “after opportunity for hearing” is changed to “after affording an opportunity to be heard” to make clear that the court can consider such questions on written submissions as well as on oral hearings.

Subparagraph (A) is revised to cover the situation where information that should have been produced without a motion to compel is produced after the motion is filed but before it is brought on for hearing. The rule also is revised to provide that a party should not be awarded its expenses for filing a motion that could have been avoided by conferring with opposing counsel.

Subparagraph (C) is revised to include the provision that formerly was contained in subdivision (a)(2) and to include the same requirement of an opportunity to be heard that is specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

**Subdivision (c).** The revision provides a self-executing sanction for failure to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), without need for a motion under subdivision (a)(2)(A).

Paragraph (1) prevents a party from using as evidence any witnesses or information that, without substantial justification, has not been disclosed as required by Rules 26(a) and 26(e)(1). This automatic sanction provides a strong inducement for disclosure of material that the disclosing party would expect to use as evidence, whether at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion, such as one under Rule 56. As disclosure of evidence offered solely for impeachment purposes is not required under those rules, this preclusion sanction likewise does not apply to that evidence.

Limiting the automatic sanction to violations “without substantial justification,” coupled with the exception for violations that are “harmless,” is needed to avoid unduly harsh penalties in a variety of situations: *e.g.*, the inadvertent omission from a Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosure of the name of a potential witness known to all parties; the failure to list as a trial witness a person so listed by another party; or the lack of knowledge of a pro se litigant of the requirement to make disclosures. In the latter situation, however, exclusion would be proper if the requirement for disclosure had been called to the litigant's attention by either the court or another party.

Preclusion of evidence is not an effective incentive to compel disclosure of information that, being supportive of the position of the opposing party, might advantageously be concealed by the disclosing party. However, the rule provides the court with a wide range of other sanctions--such as declaring specified facts to be established, preventing contradictory evidence, or, like spoliation of evidence, allowing the jury to be informed of the fact of nondisclosure--that, though not self-executing, can be imposed when found to be warranted after a hearing. The failure to identify a witness or document in a disclosure statement would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence under the same principles that allow a party's interrogatory answers to be offered against it.

**Subdivision (d).** This subdivision is revised to require that, where a party fails to file any response to interrogatories or a Rule 34 request, the discovering party should informally seek to obtain such responses before filing a motion for sanctions.

The last sentence of this subdivision is revised to clarify that it is the pendency of a motion for protective order that may be urged as an excuse for a violation of subdivision (d). If a party's motion has been denied, the party cannot argue that its subsequent failure to comply would be justified. In this connection, it should be noted that the filing of a motion under Rule 26(c) is not self-executing--the relief authorized under that rule depends on obtaining the court's order to that effect.

**Subdivision (g).** This subdivision is modified to conform to the revision of Rule 26(f).

## 2000 Amendment

**Subdivision (c)(1).** When this subdivision was added in 1993 to direct exclusion of materials not disclosed as required, the duty to supplement discovery responses pursuant to Rule 26(e)(2) was omitted. In the face of this omission, courts may rely on inherent power to sanction for failure to supplement as required by Rule 26(e)(2), *see 8 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2050 at 607-09*, but that is an uncertain and unregulated ground for imposing sanctions. There is no obvious occasion for a Rule 37(a) motion in connection with failure to supplement, and ordinarily only Rule 37(c)(1) exists as rule-based authority for sanctions if this supplementation obligation is violated.

The amendment explicitly adds failure to comply with Rule 26(e)(2) as a ground for sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1), including exclusion of withheld materials. The rule provides that this sanction power only applies when the failure to supplement was “without substantial justification.” Even if the failure was not substantially justified, a party should be allowed to use the material that was not disclosed if the lack of earlier notice was harmless.

“Shall” is replaced by “is” under the program to conform amended rules to current style conventions when there is no ambiguity.

## GAP Report

The Advisory Committee recommends that the published amendment proposal be modified to state that the exclusion sanction can apply to failure “to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2).” In addition, one minor phrasing change is recommended for the Committee Note.

### **2006 Amendment**

**Subdivision (f).** Subdivision (f) is new. It focuses on a distinctive feature of computer operations, the routine alteration and deletion of information that attends ordinary use. Many steps essential to computer operation may alter or destroy information, for reasons that have nothing to do with how that information might relate to litigation. As a result, the ordinary operation of computer systems creates a risk that a party may lose potentially discoverable information without culpable conduct on its part. Under Rule 37(f), absent exceptional circumstances, sanctions cannot be imposed for loss of electronically stored information resulting from the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.

Rule 37(f) applies only to information lost due to the “routine operation of an electronic information system” -- the ways in which such systems are generally designed, programmed, and implemented to meet the party's technical and business needs. The “routine operation” of computer systems includes the alteration and overwriting of information, often without the operator's specific direction or awareness, a feature with no direct counterpart in hard-copy documents. Such features are essential to the operation of electronic information systems.

Rule 37(f) applies to information lost due to the routine operation of an information system only if the operation was in good faith. Good faith in the routine operation of an information system may involve a party's intervention to modify or suspend certain features of that routine operation to prevent the loss of information, if that information is subject to a preservation obligation. A preservation obligation may arise from many sources, including common law, statutes, regulations, or a court order in the case. The good faith requirement of Rule 37(f) means that a party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an information system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it is required to preserve. When a party is under a duty to preserve information because of pending or reasonably anticipated litigation, intervention in the routine operation of an information system is one aspect of what is often called a “litigation hold.” Among the factors that bear on a party's good faith in the routine operation of an information system are the steps the party took to comply with a court order in the case or party agreement requiring preservation of specific electronically stored information.

Whether good faith would call for steps to prevent the loss of information on sources that the party believes are not reasonably accessible under Rule 26(b)(2) depends on the circumstances of each case. One factor is whether the party reasonably believes that the information on such sources is likely to be discoverable and not available from reasonably accessible sources.

The protection provided by Rule 37(f) applies only to sanctions “under these rules.” It does not affect other sources of authority to impose sanctions or rules of professional responsibility.

This rule restricts the imposition of “sanctions.” It does not prevent a court from making the kinds of adjustments frequently used in managing discovery if a party is unable to provide relevant responsive information. For example, a court could order the responding party to produce an additional witness for deposition, respond to additional interrogatories, or make similar attempts to provide substitutes or alternatives for some or all of the lost information.

### **2007 Amendment**

The language of Rule 37 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.

### **2013 Amendment**

Rule 37(b) is amended to conform to amendments made to Rule 45, particularly the addition of Rule 45(f) providing for transfer of a subpoena-related motion to the court where the action is pending. A second sentence is added to Rule 37(b)(1) to deal with contempt of orders entered after such a transfer. The Rule 45(f) transfer provision is explained in the Committee Note to Rule 45.

### Changes Made After Publication and Comment

As described in the Report, the published preliminary draft was modified in several ways after the public comment period. The words “before trial” were restored to the notice provision that was moved to new Rule 45(a)(4). The place of compliance in new Rule 45(c)(2)(A) was changed to a place “within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly conducts business.” In new Rule 45(f), the party consent feature was removed, meaning consent of the person subject to the subpoena is sufficient to permit transfer to the issuing court. In addition, style changes were made after consultation with the Standing Committee's Style Consultant. In the Committee Note, clarifications were made in response to points raised during the public comment period.

### 2015 Amendment

**Subdivision (a).** Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv) is amended to reflect the common practice of producing copies of documents or electronically stored information rather than simply permitting inspection. This change brings item (iv) into line with paragraph (B), which provides a motion for an order compelling “production, or inspection.”

**Subdivision (e).** Present Rule 37(e), adopted in 2006, provides: “Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.” This limited rule has not adequately addressed the serious problems resulting from the continued exponential growth in the volume of such information. Federal circuits have established significantly different standards for imposing sanctions or curative measures on parties who fail to preserve electronically stored information. These developments have caused litigants to expend excessive effort and money on preservation in order to avoid the risk of severe sanctions if a court finds they did not do enough.

New Rule 37(e) replaces the 2006 rule. It authorizes and specifies measures a court may employ if information that should have been preserved is lost, and specifies the findings necessary to justify these measures. It therefore forecloses reliance on inherent authority or state law to determine when certain measures should be used. The rule does not affect the validity of an independent tort claim for spoliation if state law applies in a case and authorizes the claim.

The new rule applies only to electronically stored information, also the focus of the 2006 rule. It applies only when such information is lost. Because electronically stored information often exists in multiple locations, loss from one source may often be harmless when substitute information can be found elsewhere.

The new rule applies only if the lost information should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation and the party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it. Many court decisions hold that potential litigants have a duty to preserve relevant information when litigation is reasonably foreseeable. Rule 37(e) is based on this common-law duty; it does not attempt to create a new duty to preserve. The rule does not apply when information is lost before a duty to preserve arises.

In applying the rule, a court may need to decide whether and when a duty to preserve arose. Courts should consider the extent to which a party was on notice that litigation was likely and that the information would be relevant. A variety of events may alert a party to the prospect of litigation. Often these events provide only limited information about that prospective litigation, however, so that the scope of information that should be preserved may remain uncertain. It is important not to be blinded to this reality by hindsight arising from familiarity with an action as it is actually filed.

Although the rule focuses on the common-law obligation to preserve in the anticipation or conduct of litigation, courts may sometimes consider whether there was an independent requirement that the lost information be preserved. Such requirements arise from many sources -- statutes, administrative regulations, an order in another case, or a party's own information-retention protocols. The court should be sensitive, however, to the fact that such independent preservation requirements may be addressed to a wide variety of concerns unrelated to the current litigation. The fact that a party had an independent obligation to preserve information does not necessarily mean that it had such a duty with respect to the litigation, and the fact that the party failed to observe some other preservation obligation does not itself prove that its efforts to preserve were not reasonable with respect to a particular case.

The duty to preserve may in some instances be triggered or clarified by a court order in the case. Preservation orders may become more common, in part because Rules 16(b)(3)(B)(iii) and 26(f)(3)(C) are amended to encourage discovery plans and orders that address preservation. Once litigation has commenced, if the parties cannot reach agreement about preservation issues, promptly seeking judicial guidance about the extent of reasonable preservation may be important.

The rule applies only if the information was lost because the party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the information. Due to the ever-increasing volume of electronically stored information and the multitude of devices that generate such information, perfection in preserving all relevant electronically stored information is often impossible. As under the current rule, the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system would be a relevant factor for the court to consider in evaluating whether a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve lost information, although the prospect of litigation may call for reasonable steps to preserve information by intervening in that routine operation. This rule recognizes that "reasonable steps" to preserve suffice; it does not call for perfection. The court should be sensitive to the party's sophistication with regard to litigation in evaluating preservation efforts; some litigants, particularly individual litigants, may be less familiar with preservation obligations than others who have considerable experience in litigation.

Because the rule calls only for reasonable steps to preserve, it is inapplicable when the loss of information occurs despite the party's reasonable steps to preserve. For example, the information may not be in the party's control. Or information the party has preserved may be destroyed by events outside the party's control -- the computer room may be flooded, a "cloud" service may fail, a malign software attack may disrupt a storage system, and so on. Courts may, however, need to assess the extent to which a party knew of and protected against such risks.

Another factor in evaluating the reasonableness of preservation efforts is proportionality. The court should be sensitive to party resources; aggressive preservation efforts can be extremely costly, and parties (including governmental parties) may have limited staff and resources to devote to those efforts. A party may act reasonably by choosing a less costly form of information preservation, if it is substantially as effective as more costly forms. It is important that counsel become familiar with their clients' information systems and digital data -- including social media -- to address these issues. A party urging that preservation requests are disproportionate may need to provide specifics about these matters in order to enable meaningful discussion of the appropriate preservation regime.

When a party fails to take reasonable steps to preserve electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation, and the information is lost as a result, Rule 37(e) directs that the initial focus should be on whether the lost information can be restored or replaced through additional discovery. Nothing in the rule limits the court's powers under Rules 16 and 26 to authorize additional discovery. Orders under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) regarding discovery from sources that would ordinarily be considered inaccessible or under Rule 26(c)(1)(B) on allocation of expenses may be pertinent to solving such problems. If the information is restored or replaced, no further measures should be taken. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that efforts to restore or replace lost information through discovery should be proportional to the apparent importance of the lost information to claims or defenses in the litigation. For example, substantial measures should not be employed to restore or replace information that is marginally relevant or duplicative.

**Subdivision (e)(1).** This subdivision applies only if information should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation, a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the information, information was lost as a result, and the information could not be restored or replaced by additional discovery. In addition, a court may resort to (e)(1) measures only “upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information.” An evaluation of prejudice from the loss of information necessarily includes an evaluation of the information's importance in the litigation.

The rule does not place a burden of proving or disproving prejudice on one party or the other. Determining the content of lost information may be a difficult task in some cases, and placing the burden of proving prejudice on the party that did not lose the information may be unfair. In other situations, however, the content of the lost information may be fairly evident, the information may appear to be unimportant, or the abundance of preserved information may appear sufficient to meet the needs of all parties. Requiring the party seeking curative measures to prove prejudice may be reasonable in such situations. The rule leaves judges with discretion to determine how best to assess prejudice in particular cases.

Once a finding of prejudice is made, the court is authorized to employ measures “no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.” The range of such measures is quite broad if they are necessary for this purpose. There is no all-purpose hierarchy of the severity of various measures; the severity of given measures must be calibrated in terms of their effect on the particular case. But authority to order measures no greater than necessary to cure prejudice does not require the court to adopt measures to cure every possible prejudicial effect. Much is entrusted to the court's discretion.

In an appropriate case, it may be that serious measures are necessary to cure prejudice found by the court, such as forbidding the party that failed to preserve information from putting on certain evidence, permitting the parties to present evidence and argument to the jury regarding the loss of information, or giving the jury instructions to assist in its evaluation of such evidence or argument, other than instructions to which subdivision (e)(2) applies. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that curative measures under subdivision (e)(1) do not have the effect of measures that are permitted under subdivision (e)(2) only on a finding of intent to deprive another party of the lost information's use in the litigation. An example of an inappropriate (e)(1) measure might be an order striking pleadings related to, or precluding a party from offering any evidence in support of, the central or only claim or defense in the case. On the other hand, it may be appropriate to exclude a specific item of evidence to offset prejudice caused by failure to preserve other evidence that might contradict the excluded item of evidence.

**Subdivision (e)(2).** This subdivision authorizes courts to use specified and very severe measures to address or deter failures to preserve electronically stored information, but only on finding that the party that lost the information acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation. It is designed to provide a uniform standard in federal court for use of these serious measures when addressing failure to preserve electronically stored information. It rejects cases such as *Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp.*, 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002), that authorize the giving of adverse-inference instructions on a finding of negligence or gross negligence.

Adverse-inference instructions were developed on the premise that a party's intentional loss or destruction of evidence to prevent its use in litigation gives rise to a reasonable inference that the evidence was unfavorable to the party responsible for loss or destruction of the evidence. Negligent or even grossly negligent behavior does not logically support that inference. Information lost through negligence may have been favorable to either party, including the party that lost it, and inferring that it was unfavorable to that party may tip the balance at trial in ways the lost information never would have. The better rule for the negligent or grossly negligent loss of electronically stored information is to preserve a broad range of measures to cure prejudice caused by its loss, but to limit the most severe measures to instances of intentional loss or destruction.

Similar reasons apply to limiting the court's authority to presume or infer that the lost information was unfavorable to the party who lost it when ruling on a pretrial motion or presiding at a bench trial. Subdivision (e)(2) limits the ability of courts to draw adverse inferences based on the loss of information in these circumstances, permitting them only when a court finds that the information was lost with the intent to prevent its use in litigation.

Subdivision (e)(2) applies to jury instructions that permit or require the jury to presume or infer that lost information was unfavorable to the party that lost it. Thus, it covers any instruction that directs or permits the jury to infer from the loss of information that it was in fact unfavorable to the party that lost it. The subdivision does not apply to jury instructions that do not involve such an inference. For example, subdivision (e)(2) would not prohibit a court from allowing the parties to present evidence to the jury concerning the loss and likely relevance of information and instructing the jury that it may consider that evidence, along with all the other evidence in the case, in making its decision. These measures, which would not involve instructing a jury it may draw an adverse inference from loss of information, would be available under subdivision (e)(1) if no greater than necessary to cure prejudice. In addition, subdivision (e)(2) does not limit the discretion of courts to give traditional missing evidence instructions based on a party's failure to present evidence it has in its possession at the time of trial.

Subdivision (e)(2) requires a finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation. This finding may be made by the court when ruling on a pretrial motion, when presiding at a bench trial, or when deciding whether to give an adverse inference instruction at trial. If a court were to conclude that the intent finding should be made by a jury, the court's instruction should make clear that the jury may infer from the loss of the information that it was unfavorable to the party that lost it only if the jury first finds that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation. If the jury does not make this finding, it may not infer from the loss that the information was unfavorable to the party that lost it.

Subdivision (e)(2) does not include a requirement that the court find prejudice to the party deprived of the information. This is because the finding of intent required by the subdivision can support not only an inference that the lost information was unfavorable to the party that intentionally destroyed it, but also an inference that the opposing party was prejudiced by the loss of information that would have favored its position. Subdivision (e)(2) does not require any further finding of prejudice.

Courts should exercise caution, however, in using the measures specified in (e)(2). Finding an intent to deprive another party of the lost information's use in the litigation does not require a court to adopt any of the measures listed in subdivision (e) (2). The remedy should fit the wrong, and the severe measures authorized by this subdivision should not be used when the information lost was relatively unimportant or lesser measures such as those specified in subdivision (e)(1) would be sufficient to redress the loss.

#### [Notes of Decisions \(2801\)](#)

Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 37, 28 U.S.C.A., FRCP Rule 37  
Including Amendments Received Through 2-1-16

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