Advisory Committee Notes
Rule 65A has been materially revised from the former rule. Some of the changes in the rule are the result of suggestions from Utah's judges, all of whom were asked for their comments on specific ways to improve injunction practice. Although most paragraphs have been changed, there are two major revisions. First, under paragraph (b) of the present rule, the court now has explicit authority to order the consolidation of trial on the merits with the hearing on a preliminary injunction. Second, the grounds for the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions have been modernized and clarified in paragraph (e). Portions of the rule have been reorganized for purposes of clarity.
Paragraph (a). Subparagraph (a)(1) is identical to paragraph (a) of the former rule. It is also identical to the corresponding subparagraph in Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Subparagraph (a)(2) is entirely new to the Utah rules. It is borrowed from subparagraph (a)(2) of the federal rule. It allows the court, in its discretion, to adjudicate the entire case at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing. If the court decides not to consolidate the trial on the merits with the preliminary injunction hearing, admissible evidence received at the preliminary injunction hearing nevertheless becomes part of the trial record and need not be introduced again.
Paragraph (b). This paragraph is similar to paragraph (b) of the former rule. It has been reorganized for clarity and has been modernized in other respects. Subparagraph (1) prohibits the issuance of a temporary restraining order unless two conditions are met. First, as in the former rule, the record must disclose that irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result if the court does not intervene. Second, the applicant or the applicant's attorney must provide written certification of any effort to give notice and the reasons for which notice should not be required. The latter requirement is new. The language in subparagraphs (3) and (4) has been modernized and clarified.
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has been revised to reflect developments in the case law and a new rule in this state on damages for wrongfully issued injunctions. Subparagraph (1) makes it clear that the court may decline to require security if it appears that none of the parties will suffer expense or damages from a wrongful temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, or if, in the particular case, there is some other substantial reason for dispensing with the requirement of security. See Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Wallace, 573 P.2d 1285, 1286-87 (Utah 1978). Otherwise, the court should require security in an appropriate amount. Subparagraph (2), which is new, makes it clear that the amount of the security required by the court does not limit the recovery that may be awarded to a wrongfully restrained party. This provision represents a change in Utah law. Compare with Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Mills, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). In the committee's view, the prior rule was unfair to the wrongfully enjoined party whose damages from the injunction may far exceed the amount of security estimated at the outset of the case. Subparagraph (2) also explicitly allows a wrongfully enjoined party to recover attorney fees. Subparagraph (3) is closely similar to language in a portion of the former rule's paragraph (c).
Paragraph (d). This paragraph is similar to the corresponding paragraph in the former rule. Borrowing a concept from paragraph (b) of the former rule, it requires the court to state its reasons for granting a temporary restraining order without notice.
Paragraph (e). This paragraph completely revises the corresponding paragraph of the former rule. The committee sought to modernize the grounds for the issuance of injunctive orders by incorporating standards consistent with national trends. There is little case law in Utah interpreting the grounds for injunctive orders, and the committee was divided as to whether the development of grounds should be left entirely to the courts. A majority of the committee believed, however, that courts and litigants would benefit from explicit standards drawn from sound authority. The standards set forth in paragraph (e) are derived from Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n. v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986), and Otero Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1981). Federal courts require proof of compliance with each of the four standards, but the weight given to each standard may vary. The substantial body of federal case authority in this area should assist the Utah courts in developing the law under paragraph (e).
Paragraph (f). This paragraph is new. It acknowledges that in domestic relations cases courts must occasionally enter prohibitory or mandatory orders under circumstances that do not permit compliance with the procedures in Rule 65A. The committee believed that this rule should not be construed to limit the authority of the court in domestic relations cases.