The defendant, ___________________(NAME), is charged [in Count ___] with [CRIME]on or about [DATE]. You cannot convict (him)(her) of this offense unless, based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that each and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant GUILTY. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one or more of these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant NOT GUILTY.
This is a pattern elements instruction that can apply in most cases. If the date or the location of a crime could be considered an element of the offense, those should be included within the list of elements. In some circumstances, identifying the specific counts might help the jury sort through offenses with similar elements. In those circumstances, the specific counts should be identified in the first paragraph.
With respect to the backeted defense element, unless the statute directs otherwise, the trial court must instruct the jury that the State must disprove an affirmative, a partial, or a justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
A person acts “intentionally” [“willfully”] [“with intent”] when (his)(her) conscious objective is to cause a certain result.
Some crimes with a mens rea of “intentionally” require that the defendant intentionally engage in conduct, while others require that the defendant intentionally cause a result. Jurors must be specifically instructed as to the definition of “intentionally” which applies to the crime(s) they are considering. If the jury is considering more than one count with a mens rea of “intentionally,” and if a single definition does not cover all counts, the jury must be instructed as to which definition applies to each count.
This instruction should be used when intentionality goes to the result of one’s conduct rather than just to the conduct itself. See, e.g., Murder, § 76-5-203 (2)(a); Child abuse, § 76-5-109 (2)(a); and Kidnapping, § 76-5-301.
A person acts “intentionally” [“willfully”] [“with intent”] when (his)(her) conscious objective is to engage in certain conduct.
“Conduct” means either an act or an omission.
Some crimes with a mens rea of “intentionally” require that the defendant intentionally engage in conduct, while others require that the defendant intentionally cause a result. Jurors must be specifically instructed as to the definition of “intentionally” which applies to the crime(s) they are considering. If the jury is considering more than one count with a mens rea of “intentionally,” and if a single definition does not cover all counts, the jury must be instructed as to which definition applies to each count.
This instruction should be used when intentionality goes to one’s conduct rather than to the result of one’s conduct. See, e.g., Homicide by Assault, § 76-5-209; Criminal Mischief (variation), § 76-6-106(2)(b); and, Having a measurable amount of controlled substance in system and driving negligently, thereby causing serious bodily injury or death, § 58-37-8(2)(g).
An example of a statute where the conduct is an omission rather than an act is Failure to Report Child Abuse, § 62A-4a-411.
A person acts “knowingly” or “with knowledge” when the person is aware that (his)(her) conduct is reasonably certain to cause a particular result.
“Conduct” means either an act or an omission.
Some crimes with a mens rea of “knowingly” require that the defendant knowingly engage in conduct, while others require that the defendant knowingly cause a result. Jurors must be specifically instructed as to the definition of “knowingly” which applies to the crime(s) they are considering. If the jury is considering more than one count with a mens rea of “knowingly,” and if a single definition does not cover all counts, the jury must be instructed as to which definition applies to each count.
This instruction should be given in crimes in which the element of the defendant’s knowledge goes to the result of his or her conduct. See, e.g., Murder, § 76-5-203(2)(a); Child abuse, § 76-5-109(2)(a); and Kidnapping, § 76-5-301.
The committee recognizes that this is not verbatim the instruction discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, 94 P.3d 263, but feels it adequately and more directly addresses the concept for crimes that require that the defendant knowingly cause a result. The committee also feels that it is inherent in the concept of knowingly causing a result that a defendant is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances.
A person acts “knowingly” or “with knowledge” when the person:
Some crimes with a mens rea of “knowingly” require that the defendant knowingly engage in conduct, while others require that the defendant knowingly cause a result. Jurors must be specifically instructed as to the definition of “knowingly” which applies to the crime(s) they are considering. If the jury is considering more than one count with a mens rea of “knowingly,” and if a single definition does not cover all counts, the jury must be instructed as to which definition applies to each count.
This instruction should be given in crimes in which the element of the defendant’s knowledge goes to one’s conduct or the circumstances surrounding one’s conduct rather than to the result of one’s conduct. See, e.g., State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984), holding that the element of knowledge for purposes of depraved indifference murder, “refers to the nature of the actor’s conduct or to the circumstance surrounding it, or both; it does not refer to the result produced by that conduct.” Id. at 1046.
Since this instruction applies to crimes in which the element of the defendant’s knowledge goes to one’s conduct or the circumstances surrounding one’s conduct rather than to the result of one’s conduct, Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, 94 P.3d 263 is inapplicable.
A person acts “recklessly” when (he)(she) is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that (his)(her) conduct will cause a particular result, consciously disregards the risk, and acts anyway.
The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that disregarding it is a gross deviation from what an ordinary person would do in that situation.
“Conduct” means either an act or an omission.
A person acts “recklessly” when (he)(she) is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that certain circumstances exist relating to (his)(her) conduct, consciously disregards the risk, and acts anyway.
The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that disregarding it is a gross deviation from what an ordinary person would do in that situation.
“Conduct” means either an act or an omission.
Simple negligence means failing to exercise that degree of care which reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
This instruction will be used in only very limited criminal prosecutions, such as Automobile Homicide, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2)(c), or Dealing in Material Harmful to a Minor, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206; see also State v. Haltom, 2007 UT 22. Although the Committee is only aware of these two statutes, caution should be exercised to ensure the appropriate mental state instruction is used in criminal cases where negligence is asserted.
A person acts with criminal negligence when (he)(she) should be aware that (his)(her) conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a particular result will occur.
The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that failing to perceive it is a gross deviation from what an ordinary person would perceive in that situation.
“Conduct” means either an act or an omission.
The Committee has created a Simple Negligence instruction (CR 305). That instruction will be used in rare circumstances. In most cases, either this instruction or CR 306B, Criminal Negligence as to Circumstances Surrounding Conduct, will be used.
A person acts with criminal negligence when (he)(she) should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that certain circumstances exist relating to (his)(her) conduct.
The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that failing to perceive it is a gross deviation from what an ordinary person would perceive in that situation.
“Conduct” means either an act or an omission.
The Committee has created a Simple Negligence instruction (CR 305). That instruction will used in rare circumstances. In most cases, either this instruction or CR 306A, Criminal Negligence as to Result of Conduct, will be used.
The concepts of “recklessness” and “criminal negligence” are similar in that both require the presence of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. They differ in that it is reckless to act if one is aware of the risk, while it is criminally negligent to act if one should be aware of the risk. In either event, the behavior must be a gross deviation from what an ordinary person would do under the same circumstances.
Unless these instructinos give a definition, you should give all words their usual and ordinary meanings.